The classic, theological tradition of just war reasoning (JWT) is not exhausted but needed more-than-ever in the shadow of global risks, when facing 'hybrid' war, and when the difference between war and peace is said to be blurring. The tradition does not speak with one voice but debate within the tradition about the (un)acceptability of military action under conditions of uncertainty sheds light, in at least three ways, on ways of approaching the range of unorthodox tactics threated in conflict today:
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by organised crime and terrorists), international military crises, large scale civil emergencies, and major accidents or natural hazards. 6 Christopher Coker has commented most directly on how national security strategies have moved in recent years from preoccupation with deterrence, defence and imminent dangers, to the language and practices of risk, awareness, pre-emption, precaution, surveillance, and vulnerability. 7 His observations on the effects of anxiety before an unknown and uncertain future stand out. As governments lack confidence that we can manage risk and strategize insecurity, Coker underscores the role of anxiety as the dominant logic of the risk society.
'What is specific to many of our own anxieties', he argues 'is that they exist in the absence of any looming historical disaster'. 8 Donald Rumsfeld's phrase 'unknown unknowns' is symptomatic of an important change rather than simply a tautological coinage and expresses high levels of anxiety in the face of uncertainty, unknown risks and the almost ungraspable complexity of the risks that we can begin to anticipate. Against this backdrop, Coker considers some of the consequences of the new logic of strategy and politics as formed by 'the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen and the unexpected' and asks whether war and violence are becoming self-sustaining in the face of 'unknown unknowns'. 9 Coker anticipates an increasing petrification of political processes and overly quick justification of violent responses to an increasingly wide range of risks: 'We are now in the business of 'managing insecurity' or 'enabling greater or lesser stability' or guaranteeing better 'service provision'.
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For present purposes, I adopt Coker's broad sub-division of discourse about risk into:
! risk as threat ! risk as managing insecurity ! risk as entailing the need to maintain 'service provision'.
Of interest is whether the JWT is capable of responding to this new context or is losing relevance to the most critical strategic choices in a context where 'risk registers' are now part of our NSS and as the language of risk assessment is commonplace in international relations.
More specifically, we are interested in the characteristics of the anxiety that anticipates an unknown and uncertain future and whether the JWT's precepts are losing direct relevance to to work hard to rethink JWT's intellectual purchase on events.
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I have explicated elsewhere some of the reasons why the JWT criteria are said to be stretched to breaking point in other contexts. 12 We are interested here in whether the narrowly judicial JWT misses the target, so to speak, with its criteria of 'right authority', 'just cause', 'rightful intention', when the mindset at policy level is about identifying and minimizing risk, minimizing risk exposure, doing the cost / benefit analysis with respect to national interest, reassuring and training the public about security. Are the JWT and 'risk society' talking past one another? Or, as I suggest, does the JWT put urgently important questions to the 'risk society' about inter alia the ethical implications of placing risk at the centre of natural security policy, and how to theorise the relation between 'just war' and risk?
Risk and the Just War Tradition
Before proceeding to explicate why and how the JWT puts questions to the 'risk society', it is necessary to underline that just war reasoning is not all the same. Distinction may be drawn between the narrowly penal, judicial JWT (with theological roots in the writings inter alia of Ambrose, Augustine, Aquinas, Gratian, Isidore of Seville, the canon lawyers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries and the Salamancan school of moral theology) and what Richard Tuck dubs the modern humanist tradition (Gentili, Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf through to Walzer and Rawls). 13 At the heart of differences between the narrow, theological tradition and the looser secularist, humanist tradition is the progressive reduction of natural law reasoning to a narrow set of rights and the single, normative principle of national self-defence. We are interested predominantly in the resources of the classic theological, narrowly judicial JWT with a view to arguing that its resources shed light on ways of approaching the range of unorthodox tactics threated in conflict today: follows, however, is that immediacy and necessity remain the critically important principles in our moral arsenal.
Risk and Fearing Well
Present-day proponents of the JWT are invited to consider when excessive fear undermines prospects for peace, why the quest for peace and security for a given nation should not be On the other hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of reason. reason ruler and the passions so that the latter participate in rationality and are subject to reason at least partially:
The condition of the body stands in a twofold relation to the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as preceding it: thus a man may be disposed in one way or another, in respect of his body, to this or that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a man becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is not subject to the command of reason: since it is due either to nature, or to some previous movement, which cannot cease at once. But the condition that is consequent, follows the command of reason: since it results from the local movement of the heart, which has various movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite.
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Hence the need for the instruction and disciplining of both individuals and communities with respect to the passions in conjunction with the virtues.
Moral virtue in the JWT cannot be without the passions, including fear, but only with the passions under the governance of reason directed toward the common good of all. There is no true moral virtue without the passions (including fear) but the passions cannot be separated from questions about justice, societal order, common good, and such like. 21 While there is nothing wrong with fear per se, not all fear is conducive to courage, rightful anger, peace and international order. At the least, the JWT invites consideration of when fear ceases to be virtuous, contributing to human excellence, and slips into vice.
The Just War Tradition and Risk as Threat
The JWT was familiar with questions about risk experienced as threat. Diverse voices in the tradition at least attempted to hold together questions of how to fear well in relation to questions about prevention (seeking 'to counter an adversary who either is preparing to mount an attack at a still undetermined point in the future, or, still more remotely, has acquired a military capability which, if exercised, would have devastating consequences for the defender') and defensive preemption (armed defense against an offensive that, by demonstrable signs, is imminent, while the former presupposes a longer time-frame), and to address these questions with the more familiar concerns about justice developed to deal with wrongs already committed. 22 Whether injury may be resisted even before it has been inflicted was not expressly discussed within the Decretum. As Gregory M. Reichberg notes in his study of preventive war in classical just war theory, however, a commentator explicated Gratian's observations by noting closeness to the Roman rules on self-defence and two key conditions:
preemptive self-defence must be exercised in the heat of the moment; the defender should limit himself to using only so much force as was necessary to ward off the attack. The already familiar principles of immediacy and proportionality with seen to apply. 23 Raymond of Peñafort later distinguished the force used in countering an attack (repulsio iniurie), i.e., defense, from any resort to force that had revenge as its primary goal. Raymond Early in what Tuck calls the modern humanist tradition, Gentili endorses preventive war and urges: 'We ought not to wait for violence to be offered us, if it is safer to meet it halfway'. 26 Gentili states boldly that his intent was to assert the justice of defending one's commonwealth not only against 'dangers that are already meditated and prepared' but also and especially against 'those which are not meditated, but are probable (verisimilia) and possible 9/16 (possibilia)'. He accepts the use military action against likely attack though circumscribes this action by maintaining that such action must be applied with circumspection since it is not meant to cover just any situation in which a prince has grown in power against his peers. More than sheer power arrayed against a prince is needed to justify military action: some other reason must be added for justice's sake. Under conditions of uncertainty, Gentili argues, it is justifiable to "make war through fear that we may ourselves be attacked. No one is more quickly laid low than one who has no fear, and a sense of security is the most common cause of disaster. ... We ought not to wait for violence to be offered us, if it is safer to meet it halfway. ... Therefore ... those who desire to live without danger ought to meet impending evils and anticipate them." 27 Gentili does not mean only that the harm is underway but that the opponent has the capacity to inflict harm:
A just cause for fear is demanded; suspicion is not enough. Now a just fear is defined as the fear of a greater evil, a fear which might properly be felt even by a man of great courage. Yet in the case of great empires I cannot readily accept that definition, which applies to private affairs. For if a private citizen commit some offence against a fellow citizen, reparation may be secured through the authority of a magistrate. But what a prince has done to a prince, no one will make good.
But since there is more than one justifiable cause for fear, and no general rule can be laid down with regard to the matter, we will merely say this, which has always been a powerful argument and must be considered so today and hereafter: namely, that we should oppose powerful and ambitious chiefs. For they are content with no bounds, and end by attacking the fortunes of all.
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In other words, Gentili addressed directly the question of a just cause for fear and was one of the first authors in the Christian West openly to endorse the idea of preventive war on the grounds of utility.
It was Grotius who made the first concerted attempt to assess the justifiability of preventive war by reference to a systematic treatment of just war principles and was aware of tensions within the tradition with respect to fear as an instinctive response to threat and the need to treat both fear and threat within the context of law, for, as he puts it, "where judicial means fail, war begins". 29 Indeed, Grotius sets his entire treatment of fear and threat from the outset within the context of law. Building on the analogy between legal action and war, Grotius observes that procedures may be directed either against offenses that have not yet been committed (non factum), or against offenses that have already been carried out: 'It has already been proved that when our lives are threatened with immediate danger, it is lawful to kill the aggressor, if the danger cannot otherwise be avoided …. We must observe that this kind of 27 Gentili, De iure belli, I, XIV. 28 Gentili, De iure belli, ibid. 29 Grotius, LWP, Bk II, ch. 1, sec. II, p.61.
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defence derives its origin from the principle of self'. 30 The intention should not be to kill but to save one's own life. The danger must be immediate and those merely planning an attack in the future may not be killed. The assumption should not be that there is a right to kill but rather 'that my knowing it will lead me to apply for the legal remedies of prevention'. 31 Steps will be to prevent imminent harm (damni infecti) are allowable only if the danger is immediate (praesens or quasi in puncto) 32 but fear alone is an insufficient standard for decision-making about the limits of defensive action but public authorities may be justified in undertaking shortterm preemptive action only when the target of such action has been found guilty of conspiracy to commit future aggression.
Focusing initially on the conditions of private self-defense, Grotius explains that if an assailant seizes weapons in such a way that his intent to kill is manifest, the crime should be forestalled it all possible but that the assailant may be killed in situations where the risk of harm is truly immediate. Under less urgent circumstances other measures will have to be adopted. Citing Cicero who warned in On Duties Bk 1 that most injuries have their origin in fear and creates a vicious circle of fear, since he who plans to do harm to another fears that, otherwise he may himself suffer harm, Grotius is clear both that we have a right to kill the assailant (or, indeed, a robber who horrifies the property-owner by his unexpected presence) but that public authorities have particular responsibilities to undertake long-term preventive action where judicial remedies exist. 33 The human condition is such that no full security can be enjoyed and protection against uncertain fears must be sought 'not from violence, but from the divine providence, and defensive precaution'. 34 In this, he lauds the ancient monarchs who did not shrink from exposing their acts to the judgment of mortals and gods. Fear alone is an insufficient standard for decision-making about the limits of defensive action. power has the ability to oppress a neighboring country its whole existence is thereby at stake it intends to do so has shown signs (marques) of 'injustice, greed, ambition, and a will to dominate in the past. 36 But Vattel allows preventive measures to be taken when the menacing power has the ability to oppress a neighboring country, intends to do so, and has shown signs (marques) of "injustice, greed, ambition, and a will to dominate" in the past, such that the whole existence of the country is thereby at stake, although it is not entirely evident the extent to which Vattel is referring here to imminent harm or a long-range plan by which the formidable power hopes one day to dominate other less powerful neighbors.
It is clear from even this brief overview that the JWT(s) do not speak with one voice.
Theorists lean in different directions with respect to the tension between fear as a primitive, instinctive response to a viable threat when one's very survival might be at stake and the need amongst civilised peoples to assess preventive (ad bellum) strategies justified first and foremost on grounds of justice and of law. Present-day proponents of the classical, theological
JWT face choices about where to locate themselves on the spectrum between permission and and restriction. Amidst this tension, I suggest drawing on the tradition as follows:
1. acceptance that fear is natural to the human condition, but warning against allowing fear alone to determine action because fear can either be virtuous or 
Risk and the Need to Maintain 'Service Provision'
With this in mind we, turn to our case-study. The UK National Security Strategy 2010 suggests that, in effect, cyberspace is the 'fourth utility' alongside electricity, gas and water. effects, that is, whether they kill persons and damage property. 44 An attack on a stock exchange or shutting down the banks would not count as a use of force under international law according to this method of comparing cyber attack to kinetic force, nor would the gathering of cyber intelligence gathering outside of on-going armed conflict but over-chlorinating a water supply so that people became ill and died, or tinkering with computers in air traffic control, probably would do so.
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The Just War Tradition Today
The JWT was never a set of criteria or check-list to be applied have refrained from characterizing any cyber operations conducted outside the context of an on-going armed conflict as either international or non-international armed conflict. 48 'Be that as it may, cyber operations will in the future inevitably present difficult conflict classification challenges for States. With regard to international armed conflict, attribution of cyber operations conducted by non-State actors will likely prove even more problematic than the attribution to States of kinetic actions has been in the past. In the context of non-international armed conflict, qualification as an organized armed group will prove increasingly complex as the structures, means and prevalence of virtual organization grow and evolve. Perhaps most importantly, the approach taken to the interpretation of the term 'armed' is, although presently reflecting lex lata, unlikely to survive.' 49 As States and non-State actors engaging in ever more destructive and disruptive cyber operations and societies becoming deeply dependent on the cyber infrastructure, Schmitt expects that state practice accompanied by opinio juris will result in a lowering of the current threshold.
The law of cyber-armed conflict is necessarily a work in progress and will remain so for the immediate future. The question is how international law will change to take account of evolving threats, and how the most powerful nation-states in the international arena will exercise leadership. With some states and non-state actors engaging in ever more destructive and disruptive cyber operations, and with societies becoming deeply dependent on the cyber infrastructure, it is inevitable and desirable that international law will develop but the JWT calls for rigorous and renewed engagement with the principles of immediacy, necessity and proportionality. 
